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INTRODUCTION 
Here is a wild thought: if you were born in 1880 and lived to be at 
least eighty-nine years old, you would live until 1969.  That means in 
your lifetime you would have gone from riding horses and carriages as 
a young child, to seeing the United States (U.S.) put a man on the moon.  
Consider how drastic that progress was for humankind.  Now, fifty 
years later, in 2019, we are hearing about plans for space tourism and 
colonizing Mars.1  So, we must ask: How much further will we go?  
How fast will it happen?  How will our society possibly keep up with 
the expeditious growth of technology? 
The twentieth century was the birth of the space age where the most 
powerful nations of Earth accomplished unimaginable feats of genius.  
Based on what we have seen so far, in the twenty-first century we will 
witness the birth of a new space age dominated by private actors and 
commercial ventures, rather than by governments and nations. 
As exciting as this may seem, many risks come with the increased 
commercialization of space by private actors; our society may not be 
readily equipped to address those risks.  Outer space has untapped 
                                                          
1. See Tariq Malik, Elon Musk Unveils SpaceX’s New Starship Plans for Private 
Trips to the Moon, Mars and Beyond, SPACE, https://www.space.com/elon-musk-
unveils-spacex-starship-2019-update.html (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). 
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potential that can be revolutionary to humankind or potentially 
destructive.  The truth is that we will not know the potential of 
commercializing space until we fully understand space.  This dilemma 
raises the question: If we do not understand outer space, how are we 
supposed to regulate it?  This problem is magnified when we realize 
that we cannot even come to an agreement on current world problems; 
so, how are we supposed to agree on the unknown? 
This comment discusses the current state of domestic and 
international space law and how we got to the status quo.  It assesses 
where space law has succeeded and failed to illustrate how we can 
create a new and improved regulatory scheme building on lessons we 
have learned.  It is imperative that we find a new regulatory structure.  
A recent surge in the use of space by private actors has presented new 
issues that must be addressed.  Our current platform for regulation, both 
domestically and internationally, has failed to adequately address the 
growing concerns associated with the increased commercialization of 
space.  Therefore, we need a new regulatory platform that can garner 
universal support and cooperation. 
Part I discusses the evolution of space law, both domestically and 
internationally.  It examines the political and economic forces that drive 
the current state of space law.  The discussion focuses on the gradual 
commercialization of space, which strays from the original provisions 
of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), formerly known as the international 
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the 
Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies.  Moreover, Part I also illustrates that there is a need 
for increased regulation of space commercialization because the OST 
lacks any binding international authority to enforce its provisions. 
Part II focuses on specific factors that made the OST successful.  
Further, it analyzes other international treaties to determine how the 
presence or absence of such factors may have contributed to the success 
or failure of those treaties.  Ultimately, this analysis aims to identify the 
key components for creating a successful agreement among the 
international community to effectively regulate an increasingly 
commercialized outer space. 
Part III proceeds to offer a new platform to regulate space on a 
domestic and international level.  The factors that were critical to the 
success of past treaties is used as the foundation for this new regulatory 
platform.  Finally, I apply the platform to the current state of the space 
3
Harper: Planetary Protection:  A New Launch Pad for the Regulation of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Harper camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  11:08 AM 
210 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
industry and international law to illustrate how this regulatory scheme 
would work in practice. 
The world is not equipped to face the new challenges that will soon 
arise from the exponential increase in space activity.  Therefore, it is 
time to reinvent the wheel (or the spaceship equivalent of the wheel). 
I.  THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF SPACE LAW AND THE PUSH 
TOWARD COMMERCIALIZATION 
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the United States and 
the Soviet Union dominated outer space exploration.  During the Cold 
War, tensions between the two superpowers grew.  In response, in a 
1967 agreement, the United Nations established a set of international 
guidelines for the use of space under the Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, otherwise known as the 
Outer Space Treaty (OST).2  The treaty serves as the foundation of 
international space law to promote the peaceful use of space and 
progress for all humankind. 
The international community has widely accepted the OST.  
Subsequent agreements were established to elaborate on the OST’s 
intentions and to reaffirm the major issues that arise with the use of 
space.  However, as international interests changed over time, space law 
began to transition from international cooperation to domestic 
legislation within each spacefaring3 nation, using the OST as a 
guideline. 
Conflicting, and often polarizing, national interests resulted in 
different interpretations of the OST and inconsistency in the regulation 
of space.  This has become a greater problem now because of the rapid 
commercialization of space, which increased the number of actors 
engaged in space activity.  This section discusses the evolution of space 
law toward a new era of space commercialization. 
                                                          
2. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 
18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. 
3. Spacefaring nations are nations that “hav[e] vehicles capable of traveling 
beyond the earth’s atmosphere.”  Spacefaring, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/spacefaring (last visited Apr. 11, 
2019).  
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A.  Evolution of Space Law Toward Commercialization 
One of the most successful treaties to govern international space 
law is the OST, which went into effect on October 10, 1967.4  As of 
2019, there are 109 parties to the treaty, and eighty-nine other countries 
have signed the treaty but have not fully ratified it.5 
1.  The Birth of the Outer Space Treaty 
The OST was a response to the growing tensions and major 
concerns of the Cold War Era.6  The OST’s narrow focus left the 
remainder of space law issues largely unregulated.7  The OST was born 
in a time when major issues surrounding the Cold War needed to be 
addressed on an international level.8  In the time leading up to the 
OST’s formation, the world had experienced World War II’s 
devastating impact.  Following the war, two superpowers emerged with 
a drastic divergence in ideology: western capitalism in the United States 
and communism in the Soviet Union.9 
                                                          
4. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2. See also Christopher D. Johnson, The Outer 
Space Treaty at 50,  THE SPACE REVIEW (Jan. 23, 2017), 
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/3155/1 (“As a successful undertaking in 
international diplomacy, and one that helped foster the global development of outer 
space as a realm of humankind’s activities, the importance of [the OST’s opening for 
signature] warrants reflection.”).  
5. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and 
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: Status of the 
Treaty, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/outer_space (last visited Oct. 
17, 2019).  
6. Jason Krause, The Outer Space Treaty Turns 50. Can It Survive a New Space 
Race?, ABA JOURNAL (Apr. 2017), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/ 
article/outer_space_treaty. 
7. See id. (“[T]he [OST] was very much written to address military, scientific 
and political questions—not with commercial interests in mind. As a result, there is 
no framework for regulating or managing commercial actors in space. ‘The document 
mentions “nongovernmental agencies” only once,’ Gabrynowicz says. ‘And because 
of that oversight, there is no U.S. agency with jurisdiction of on-orbit activity. That’s 
a big gap in the law.’”). 
8. Arguably, the potential of devastating nuclear war was an international issue 
that required international cooperation. See id.   
9. Erin Blakemore, What Was the Cold War?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Mar. 22, 
2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/reference/cold-war/.  
5
Harper: Planetary Protection:  A New Launch Pad for the Regulation of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Harper camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  11:08 AM 
212 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
As tensions increased during the 1950s and 1960s, the two 
superpowers engaged in both a nuclear arms and space race.10  During 
this time, major concerns arose at the United Nations regarding the 
outer space rivalry between the United States and Soviet Union.11  This 
rivalry created an urgent need to promote international cooperation and 
peace.12  The Cuban Missile Crisis was a catalyst for addressing these 
concerns.13  The Cuban Missile Crisis was a nuclear standoff between 
the United States and the Soviet Union from October 16, 1962, to 
October 28, 1962.14  At that time, the two superpowers came the closest 
to escalating their ideological conflict into a full scale nuclear war than 
at any other time during the Cold War.15 
Soon after the crisis, the United Nations General Assembly 
(Assembly) met on November 21, 1962, to discuss its concern of  
“avert[ing] the grave dangers to the human race of nuclear 
confrontation . . . .”16  A few weeks later, on December 14, 1962, the 
United Nations “urgently” requested the Committee on the Peaceful 
Uses of Outer Space “[to] work on the further elaboration of basic legal 
principles governing the activity of States in the exploration and use of 
outer space . . . and on other legal problems.”17  About a year later, on 
December 13, 1963, the Assembly submitted a Declaration of Legal 
Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use 
                                                          
10. See id.  
11. See generally G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472 
(XIV), (Dec. 12, 1959); G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), (Dec. 20, 1961); G.A. Res. 1802 
(XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962); G.A. Res. 1962-63 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A. Res. 2130 
(XX), (Dec. 21, 1965). 
12. See generally G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), (Dec. 13, 1958); G.A. Res. 1472 
(XIV), (Dec. 12, 1959); G.A. Res. 1721 (XVI), (Dec. 20, 1961); G.A. Res. 1802 
(XVII), (Dec. 19, 1962); G.A. Res. 1962-63 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963); G.A. Res. 2130 
(XX), (Dec. 21, 1965). 
13. The Cuban Missile Crisis catalyzed the need to address these concerns 
because it was the closest the superpowers came to actual nuclear conflict. Blakemore, 
supra note 9. 
14. See Patrick J. Kiger, Key Moments in the Cuban Missile Crisis, HISTORY 
(June 17, 2019), https://www.history.com/news/cuban-missile-crisis-timeline-jfk-
khrushchev.  
15. Blakemore, supra note 9. 
16. G.A. Res. 1767 (XVII), (Nov. 21, 1962).   
17. G.A. Res. 1802(I)(3) (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962).   
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of Outer Space,18 which laid out many of the principles that would later 
be included in the OST.  The Assembly discussed its intent for the treaty 
to function as an agreement to promote progress and the peaceful use 
of outer space for the benefit of all humankind, regardless of a nation’s 
economic or scientific development.19  Over time, change in the 
political and economic climate of the world led to differing interests 
among nations.  These competing interests ultimately affected the way 
space law developed. 
2.  Subsequent Treaties to the Outer Space Treaty 
The OST served its purpose of regulating space law by addressing 
the Cold War concerns, promoting the peaceful cooperation in the use 
of outer space, and preventing a potential nuclear war.  Over time, 
subsequent treaties continued to focus on these concerns.  In 1967, the 
Assembly established the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the 
Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space (Rescue Agreement).20  The Rescue Agreement elaborates on 
Article V of the OST, which requires nations to assist each other in 
rescuing astronauts in distress and in recovering space objects to return 
them to their respective nations.21  Later in 1972, the United Nations 
established the Convention on International Liability for Damage 
Caused by Space Objects treaty (Liability Convention).22  The Liability 
Convention expanded Article VII of the OST regarding liability of 
states for damages caused by their own space objects.23  In 1976, the 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 
(Registration Convention) went into effect, which requires states to 
register and provide information to the United Nations about the space 
                                                          
18. G.A. Res. 1962 (XVIII), (Dec. 13, 1963). 
19. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966).   
20. G.A. Res. 2345 (XXII), (Dec. 19, 1967); Agreement on the Rescue of 
Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer 
Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570 [hereinafter Rescue Agreement]. 
21. See Rescue Agreement; see also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. V.  
22. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, 
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Liability Convention]. 
23. Id. See also Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII. 
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objects that they have in orbit around the Earth or beyond.24  All of 
these agreements promoted further collaboration between states by 
making space exploration activity more accessible and transparent. 
However, the most recent international space treaty did not gain 
much acceptance as space law transitioned away from international 
regulation toward domestic law.  This treaty was the Agreement 
Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial 
Bodies (Moon Agreement), which consists of only eighteen State 
Parties.25  Neither the United States nor any major spacefaring nation 
is a party to the agreement.26  The Moon Agreement, effective July 11, 
1984, grants jurisdictional control of all celestial bodies to international 
law, and it reaffirms the use of celestial bodies and their natural 
resources for the benefit of all mankind.27  The Moon Agreement’s 
failed attempt to promote the idea of non-appropriation of property in 
space illustrates that nations realized space’s potential and deviated 
from international collaboration toward commercialization of space. 
3.  Current U.S. Space Law 
The OST has always served as a guideline for nations to develop 
their own domestic law, especially as space law shifted from 
                                                          
24. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Nov. 12, 
1974, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Registration Convention].  
25. Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies, Dec. 18, 1979, 18 U.S.T. 2410 [hereinafter Moon Treaty]; see also 
Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies: 
Status of the Treaty, UNODA, http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon (last visited 
Oct. 18, 2019). 
26. See Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies: Status of the Treaty, UNODA, 
http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/moon (last visited Oct. 18, 2019); see also 
Shekhar Chandra, India’s “Vyomanauts” Seek to Join the Elite Club of Spacefaring 
Nations by 2022, SCI. AMERICAN (Aug. 23, 2018), 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/india-rsquo-s-ldquo-vyomanauts-rdquo-
seek-to-join-the-elite-club-of-spacefaring-nations-by-2022/ (stating that the United 
States, Russia, and China are the only countries to have successfully achieved 
spaceflight). 
27. See generally Moon Treaty, supra note 25 (stating that the “exploration and 
use of the Moon shall be the province of all mankind and shall be carried out for the 
benefit and in the interests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or 
scientific development”).  
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international treaties to domestic legislation.  As this transition 
occurred, the OST’s lack of binding authority led to different 
interpretations of its vague language.  As a result, international 
cooperation faded, and nations developed their own domestic space law 
to align with their own interests.  This transition toward domestic space 
law eventually led to a focus on the commercialization of space as 
private actors became increasingly involved in the space industry. 
The first sign of this push for commercialization of space was when 
most spacefaring nations refused to sign the Moon Agreement. 28  This 
refusal was based on the agreement’s intended purpose to expand 
international authority in space.29  The expansion of international 
authority would limit the ability of individual nations to pursue their 
respective interests in commercial space ventures. 
It has been predicted that “[r]ather than amend[ing] the treaty, 
space-faring nations like the United States will likely pass legislation to 
authorize and supervise space activities.”30  For example, instead of 
signing the Moon Agreement in 1984, the United States passed the 
Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984.31  Under this act, private 
entities were permitted to launch vehicles into space for the first time, 
expanding the space industry beyond the government’s exclusive use,32 
but this transition was a gradual process.  Moreover, until the passing 
of the Asteroids Act in 2014, private space activity was limited to the 
use of satellites.33  The Asteroids Act expanded private actors’ freedom 
in space to “facilitate the commercial exploration and utilization of 
                                                          
28. See Krause, supra note 6; see also Rachel Mitchell, Into the Final Frontier: 
The Expanse of Space Commercialization, 83 MO. L. REV. 429, 436 (2018).  
29. The agreement “calls for the establishment of an international regime to 
govern exploitation of the Moon’s resources.” See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 435. 
30. Krause, supra note 6.   
31. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984) 
(codified as 51 U.S.C. § 50901, et seq. (2010)). 
32. Id.  
33. See American Bar Ass’n, Space Law Then, Now, and in the Future: A 
Conversation with Pamela Meredith and Laura Montgomery, 30 AIR & SPACE 
LAWYER NO. 4 (2017), https://www.kmazuckert.com/publications/space/ 
ABA_AirSpaceLawyer_v030n04_Meredith_Montgomery.pdf (stating that there has 
been a push to allow private actors to own commercial extractions from asteroids and 
the Moon) [hereinafter American Bar Ass’n]. 
9
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asteroid resources to meet national needs.”34  This law allowed the 
government to collaborate with private entities to harness the 
commercial potential of space.35  Finally, in 2015, the United States 
passed the Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, also 
known as the SPACE Act.36  This act allows private actors to obtain 
property rights over the resources they mine from asteroids.37 
As of today, the United States has the most developed space 
regulation framework in the world.38  For this reason, countries such as 
the United Kingdom, France, and Japan have discussed integrating U.S. 
space law into their own legal systems.39  Moreover, the SPACE Act, 
among other factors, has catalyzed the emergence of a new space 
industry as private entities develop the technology to explore and 
harness the potential of space. 
B.  Factors Contributing to Increased Commercialization 
Throughout the twentieth century, space exploration and travel was 
largely a race between superpower nations.  However, in recent years, 
companies such as SpaceX, Blue Origin, and Virgin Galactic have been 
racing to establish commercial space ventures for tourism, mining, and 
other endeavors. 40  Therefore, it is no surprise that when the SPACE 
Act was enacted in 2015, the space industry grew to $323 billion.41  
Besides the SPACE Act, there are several reasons space 
                                                          
34. Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. (2014). The Asteroids Act became 
part of the U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act. See generally 
Matthew Shaer, The Asteroid Miner’s Guide to the Galaxy, FOREIGN POL’Y (Apr. 28, 
2016), https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/04/28/the-asteroid-miners-guide-to-the-
galaxy-space-race-mining-asteroids-planetary-research-deep-space-industries/.  
35. See Asteroids Act, H.R. 5063, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted) (stating that its 
purpose is to “facilitate the commercial exploration and utilization of asteroid 
resources . . . [by] discourag[ing] government barriers to the development of 
economically viable, safe, and stable industries . . . ”). 
36. U.S. Commercial Space Launch Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 114-90, 
129 Stat. 704 (2015) (enacted). 
37. Id. 
38. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
39. Id.   
40. Krause, supra note 6. 
41. W. P. Carey School, The Business of Space, MEDIUM (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://medium.com/w-p-carey-magazine/the-business-of-space-2389ed011d7c.  
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commercialization has expanded rapidly from satellites in 1984, to 
mining operations today and tourism in the near future. 
1.  NASA’s Reliance on Private Actors 
Currently, the U.S. government is more involved with private space 
ventures by encouraging the private sector’s involvement in space 
through funding and legislation.42  Private actors must be on the 
forefront of space exploration as government funding for the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) dwindles.43  There is 
uncertainty about NASA’s ability to continue its progress in space 
considering lack of funding.  For example, in 2011, the Space Shuttle 
Program, the successor to NASA’s Apollo missions that put a man on 
the moon, ended.44  Further, NASA’s financially difficulties are 
impeding its ability to afford the cost of ferrying astronauts to the 
International Space Station (ISS).45 
As a result, the U.S. government has taken steps to encourage and 
facilitate companies such as Boeing and SpaceX to develop technology 
that would make “space more accessible from an operational and cost 
perspective.”46  The government has thus prioritized the commercial 
space industry’s growth by offering various private contracts.47  For 
example, NASA contracted with SpaceX and Boeing to develop better 
                                                          
42. See Prospects for Space Exploration: Economic and Strategic Assessment, 
BUS. WIRE (Mar. 27, 2019, 1:24 PM), https://www.businesswire.com/news/ 
home/20190327005644/en/Prospects-Space-Exploration-Economic-Strategic-
Assessment—.  
43. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (explaining that NASA’s contracts 
with private companies such as SpaceX and Boeing are not being adequately funded). 
44. Space Shuttle Era, NASA, https://www.nasa.gov/mission_pages/shuttle/ 
flyout/index.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2019). 
45. Part of the Space Shuttle program was to shuttle astronauts to space who 
could complete the ISS, but the program became too costly. See Michele Lerner, Why 
Did NASA End the Space Shuttle Program?, FORBES (Feb. 2, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/quora/2017/02/02/why-did-nasa-end-the-space-
shuttle-program/#434f2616799f.  
46. One example of this technology is reusable rockets. American Bar Ass’n, 
supra note 33. 
47. By involving private entities, the government can lower its costs. This 
means it has an incentive to prioritize private contracts over conducting the activities 
itself. See Lerner, supra note 45. 
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technology to facilitate the transportation of U.S. astronauts to the 
ISS.48  This collaboration created “a high degree of collegiality and 
interchange between government and the private sector . . . .”49 
Although funding shortfalls have caused difficulties for U.S. space 
exploration, NASA’s attempt to encourage private sector participation 
in space ventures will allow the United States to continue pursuing its 
interests in outer space. 
2.  Collapse of the Soviet Union 
The end of the Cold War allowed more collaboration in the 
international space community.  “The breakup of the Soviet Union and 
the creation of new East-West ventures . . . contributed greatly to . . . 
space law practice.”50  Together with the emergence of the private 
sector, this new collaborative environment made space travel more 
feasible and affordable. 51 
For example, after the Soviet Union collapsed, the United States 
began working with private Russian companies with access to launch 
technology because it was less expensive to launch from Russia.52  
However, now that the private space industry has rapidly grown, 
driving costs down in the United States, some experts believe it is better 
to spend the money on private U.S. companies.53  Shifting these 
investments would likely increase the presence of U.S. companies in 
outer space and help the United States maintain its own interests. 
3.  Economic Potential 
Worldwide, the potential for private actors and more countries to 
participate in space ventures because of various factors has increased; 
                                                          
48. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
49. Id. 
50. Id. 
51. This feasibility and affordability can also be attributed to an overall increase 
in global space budgets due to an increased involvement of private actors with 
government entities. See BUS. WIRE, supra note 42. 
52. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
53. See id. (stating that although U.S. companies should be in charge of 
servicing the ISS, there is still no adequate funding from the government; therefore, 
the United States still relies on Russian companies).  
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one of those factors is a decrease in the cost of building and launching 
satellites.54  According to a March 2019 report by Prospects for Space 
Exploration, “[g]lobal government investment in space exploration 
totaled $14.6 billion in 2017, a 6% increase compared to 2016.”55  The 
rapid increase in funding and investing in space commercialization will 
likely see this projection grow exponentially in the near future. 
To put this increase into perspective, in the last decade alone, there 
were nineteen space exploration missions conducted by six global 
powers, including the United States, European Union, Russia, Japan, 
China, and India. 56  Now, with the inclusion of private actors in space 
ventures, either through independent ventures or government contracts, 
this number is expected to increase to eighty missions over the next 
decade. 57  Of this estimate, only sixty-three percent will be government 
missions, while the remainder of the missions will be conducted by 
private companies. 58  Two private companies, Deep Space Industries 
and Planetary Resources, are developing plans to mine asteroids using 
robots,59 which could be an extremely lucrative venture.  It is estimated 
that an asteroid the size of a football field can potentially contain up to 
$50 billion worth of platinum.60 
C.  Problems with Space Law: Regulation of Commercialization 
A rapid increase in commercialization has generated concerns over 
the current state of space law and its ability to regulate such an 
expanding industry.  International law is vague regarding commercial 
space regulation because the OST was a product of Cold War mentality, 
                                                          
54. Id. 
55. PROSPECTS FOR SPACE EXPL., PROSPECTS FOR SPACE EXPLORATION REPORT 
2019 (2019),  https://www.researchandmarkets.com/research/8xmjbj/ 
global_market?w=5 (on file with author). “Prospects for Space Exploration is an 
economic and strategic assessment of the space exploration sector, including an 
analysis and benchmark of government and commercial space exploration programs 
worldwide.” See also BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.  
56. BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.  
57. Id. 
58. About thirty of the eighty expected missions will be commercial. See id. 
59. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
60. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 441. 
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which does not take into consideration contemporaneous issues.61  
“[T]he treaty was very much written to address military, scientific and 
political questions — not with commercial interests in mind.”62 
For example, the OST does not clearly address the process that will 
apply when there is a dispute between two parties in space: 
It’s not clear which international court would be called on to settle a 
dispute in space.  In order to fully address these and other concerns, 
the U.N. would need to amend existing treaties or draft new ones.  
That would likely be the only way to create binding legal opinions 
in space law, but in the current political climate, there is little 
political will or interest in new treaties.63 
Still, it is more problematic that the OST only applies to states that 
are parties to the treaty, not commercial actors.64  As a result, there is 
no international “framework for regulating or managing commercial 
actors in space[,]” and such actors are largely regulated through 
domestic law.65  However, domestic law has expanded 
commercialization beyond the scope of the OST and has created 
conflicting interpretations of the OST’s guidelines because they are too 
vague and unenforceable; the result is less cooperation among the 
international community to regulate the commercial space industry. 
D.  Regulation Under Article VI 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty serves as the “foundation on 
which any laws or regulations regarding commercial space activity are 
                                                          
61. The major concern during the Cold War era was preventing mass destruction 
through nuclear disarmament. Therefore, there are large gaps in space law regarding 
certain activities such as commercialization. See Krause, supra note 6. 
62. Id.  
63. Id.  
64. “States Parties to the Treaty shall bear international responsibility for 
national activities in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, 
whether such activities are carried on by governmental agencies or by non-
governmental entities.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI. 
65. See Krause, supra note 6 (arguing that countries like the United States will 
likely pass laws and regulations to address space activity due to gaps in the OST, such 
as addressing commercial actors). 
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erected.”66  The United States can use Article VI as a tool for regulating 
private actors in space because the article states in pertinent part that 
activities of government and private civilians must be authorized and 
supervised by their respective governments if they are to undertake any 
venture in space.67 
However, Article VI is vague as to private actors’ involvement in 
space because the regulation of commercialization was not the original 
intent behind the OST.68  The treaty was drafted during the emergence 
of the space industry, so certain issues surrounding the regulation of 
private space actors were neglected and later regulated by domestic 
law.69  Perhaps the greatest problem is that domestic space law must 
conform with the OST, which means disagreement over the vague 
interpretation of the OST has slowed the progress toward effective 
regulation. 
For example, some people argue for a narrow interpretation that 
Article VI is not enforceable in United States because the provision is 
not self-executing, meaning Congress should only regulate when space 
activity poses a dangerous threat to humankind.70  Conversely, some 
argue for a broader interpretation that Congress should regulate all 
private space activity because the government is responsible for the 
activities of its private entities under Article VI.71  Depending on the 
interpretation taken, Article VI can have drastically different results, 
                                                          
66. Id. 
67. “This does not mean a State like the United States is compelled to authorize 
a private space activity but rather permits a State to allow non-government entities to 
perform space activities.” See Michael J. Listner, A Reality Check on Article VI and 
Private Space Activities, SPACE NEWS (June 6, 2017), https://spacenews.com/a-
reality-check-on-article-vi-and-private-space-activities/; see also Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. VI.  
68. Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that the original intent of the OST was to 
address scientific, military, and political questions). 
69. For example, because the OST did not address commercial actors, the 
United States passed the SPACE Act, which allowed the commercial exploration and 
exploitation of space resources. See id. 
70. The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that a non-self-executing treaty cannot 
be enforced in the United States. American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
71. One of the previous Federal Aviation Administrations (FAA) had proposed 
that everything in space should be regulated. See id.; see also Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. VI. 
15
Harper: Planetary Protection:  A New Launch Pad for the Regulation of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Harper camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  11:08 AM 
222 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
illustrating “considerable regulatory uncertainty.”72  To add to the 
uncertainty, many of the new proposed private space activities do not 
necessarily fit into the traditional regulatory scope of existing U.S. 
agencies, such as the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC); thus, there is much overlap in 
what agency regulates what activity. 73 
The attempt to use Article VI to regulate private commercial actors 
in space has failed.  “The big issue going forward is whether and how 
to regulate . . . new space activities.”74  Even if the United States can 
successfully establish its own domestic law, without a strong 
international framework for regulation, the United States will still face 
international and domestic scrutiny for regulation of its commercial 
actors under the provisions of the OST.”75 
Since the OST’s ratification in 1967, international interests have 
transitioned from focusing on Cold War concerns regarding nuclear 
prevention to prioritizing commercial interests in space.  This new 
focus has rested largely on a broad interpretation of Article VI of the 
OST, which was not created with the intent of regulating private actors.  
Article VI regulation has also proved ineffective because of the vast 
disagreement regarding its interpretation and application.  Therefore, it 
is both necessary and urgent to develop a new platform. 
II.  A NEED FOR REGULATION 
As explained in part I, Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty has 
failed to effectively address whether the private actions and regulations 
                                                          
72. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (discussing that there is a split 
between the approaches taken by the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. 
Senate). 
73. Although there has been some overlap, some think that this has not impeded 
progress in space law and can benefit it by bringing in different expertise. But see 
American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33.  
74. Id. 
75. The main reason for such critique could be that international cooperation in 
space law is necessary, as exemplified through numerous U.N. resolutions, but by 
taking its own measures, the United States is seen as unwilling to cooperate 
internationally. See Yun Zhao, Space Commercialization and the Development of 
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by the United States conforms with the general principles of the OST.  
Part II expands on how Article VI has failed to regulate 
commercialization of space by discussing the need to adopt a 
universally appealing platform to promote international cooperation. 
A.  Root of Success in Space Law 
To understand why international cooperation in space law has 
faded, it is important to consider the failures and successes of past 
international space treaties.  Although the OST has no real authority to 
regulate space law, it has been the most successful space treaty 
considering the number of nations that have accepted and ratified it.  
The OST has served as the foundation for three subsequent treaties that 
expanded its principles.  At least three identifiable factors contributed 
to the OST’s success.  These factors include (1) the treaty’s intent to 
promote the greater good of mankind, (2) its focus on a universally 
accepted concern, and (3) its relatively loose restrictions. 
1.  First Factor: The OST’s Intent to Promote the Greater Good for 
All of Mankind 
The first factor that has made the OST successful is the intent with 
which it was created.  On December 19, 1966, the United Nations’ 21st 
General Assembly laid out the OST’s provisions.76  On January 27, 
1967, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union 
signed the treaty.77  The General Assembly discussed its intent for the 
treaty to function as an agreement to promote progress and the peaceful 
use of outer space for the benefit of humankind, regardless of a nation’s 
economic or scientific development.78 
When it was ratified, the OST reflected the international 
community’s desire to reaffirm “the importance of international co-
operation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use of 
outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the 
                                                          
76. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966). 
77. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration 
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, UNOOSA, 
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/ourwork/spacelaw/treaties/introouterspacetreaty 
.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2019). 
78. G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 1966).  
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importance of developing the rule of law in this new area of human 
endeavor . . . .”79 
Because space exploration is intriguing and relatively new, the 
United Nations has continuously recognized the potential advantages 
that space has for mankind.80  As such, the OST’s language emphasizes 
the United Nations’ desire for space to be used in a peaceful way.  In 
essence, the treaty promotes international cooperation to reap the 
potential benefits of space for “all mankind.”81 
2.  Second Factor: The OST’s Provisions Addressed a Universally 
Accepted Concern 
The second factor that made OST a success was that it was created 
as a response to Cold War Era concerns as reflected by its provisions 
and purpose.82  At the time, the world had just seen the Nazis rapidly 
rise to power during the 1930’s.83  Around the same time, the Japanese 
Imperial Army overthrew the colonial powers in Asia and began to 
build its own empire.84  In the process, both of these new superpowers 
committed acts that led to World War II. 85  Eventually, the majority of 
the world became involved in this conflict, where misuse of power and 
technology resulted in the development of a new technology: nuclear 
                                                          
79. Id. 
80. For example, social and economic advantages can arise from the 
advancement of meteorology and communications technologies in outer space. G.A. 
Res. 1802 (XVII), (Dec. 14, 1962).   
81. “The exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other 
celestial bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries, 
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall be the 
province of all mankind.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I. 
82. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that the OST was a reflection 
of Cold Era concerns and as such the treaty focused on the specific issues of military 
and science, leaving large gaps in the treaty). 
83. See Wilfrid F. Knapp et al., Adolf Hitler: Dictator of Germany, 
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Adolf-Hitler 
(last updated May 3, 2019). 
84. See Marius B. Jansen et al., Japan, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Japan/History (last updated Oct. 24, 2019). 
85. See id.; see also Knapp, supra note 83.  
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energy.86  At that time, nuclear energy had an unknown potential for 
power and destruction, which is similar to the unknown potential of the 
exploration and commercialization of space in today’s world. 
The Cold War era created the fear of a sovereign nation, once again, 
becoming too powerful. 87  Leading up to 1967 when the treaty was 
drafted, there were two superpower nations, the United States and 
Soviet Union, which threatened the existence of humankind with the 
possibility of starting a nuclear war. 88  These two nations were the first 
to harness the ability to utilize the power of space.89 
Provisions in the OST addressed the concern of a nation gaining 
too much power.  Specifically, the OST prevents sovereign nations 
from claiming territory in space and requires that the fruits of space 
exploration be used for the benefit of everyone on Earth.90  For 
example, Article II states that a nation cannot claim a celestial body as 
their own sovereign territory through occupation or any other means.91  
Further, Article IV stresses the use of celestial bodies for peaceful 
purposes only.92  Notably, Article IV prohibits weapons of mass 
destruction in space, specifically nuclear weapons.93  This prohibition 
includes placing weapons on celestial bodies, stationing weapons 
anywhere, or putting weapons into orbit.94 
Additionally, the OST addressed Cold War concerns by promoting 
human collaboration in space.  The first Article in the treaty expressly 
provides that activity in space and on celestial bodies should be done 
                                                          
86. See Robert S. Norris et al., Nuclear Weapon, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/technology/nuclear-weapon (last updated June 7, 2019).  
87. The United States and Russia viewed each other with suspicion because 
each was trying to prevent the other from dominating the world. See Blakemore, supra 
note 9. 
88. During this period, both countries poured trillions of dollars into developing 
their nuclear weapons to defend themselves from each other. See id.  
89. “After the 1950s the US and USSR were deep into a Space Race, adding 
another arena to the Cold War competition to be the most militarily prepared.” See id.  
90. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I-II. 
91. Id. art. II. 
92. As a result of this peaceful purpose, the “establishment of military bases, 
installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of 
military [maneuvers] on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.” Id. art. IV. 
93. Id.  
94. Id.  
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“for the benefit and in the interests of all countries . . . [and] without 
discrimination of any kind.”95  Article III stresses the importance of all 
nations maintaining international peace and promoting cooperation.96  
Article V establishes that astronauts should be the ambassadors of all 
mankind, which entails offering assistance to anyone in distress, 
regardless of national origin.97  This provision aimed to prevent the use 
of space for a single nation’s benefit and instead, provide benefits for 
the greater good, such as scientific progress. 
The OST’s major provisions were a direct response to the fears that 
formed in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War.  With newfound 
nuclear arsenals, the potential for destruction was high; thus, the 
international community accepted the OST as a means to alleviate those 
fears. 98 
3.  The OST is Not Overly Restrictive 
The last factor attributable to the OST’s success is that it is not 
overly restrictive; it allows the nations to maintain much of their 
sovereignty.  For instance, the OST includes a process that allows the 
nations to withdraw from the treaty.99  The OST does not bind any 
nation to any sort of obligation or burden unless it decides to engage in 
space activity.100  Moreover, no international court has the express 
authority to resolve a dispute under the OST, which means the parties 
must negotiate to reach a resolution.101 
                                                          
95. Id. art. I. 
96. Id. art. III. 
97. It must be noted that the article specifically states that assistance shall be 
rendered to all astronauts of State Parties and does not mention non-State Parties. Id. 
art. V. 
98. See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 432. 
99. “Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the 
Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary 
Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of 
this notification.” Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. XVI. 
100. The treaty lays out a few prohibitions on space activity, thus, it can be 
argued that as long as a State Party is not engaged in these activities, it does not have 
an affirmative duty under the treaty. Moreover, no express language in the treaty hints 
at an enforcement mechanism to impose legal liability on a State Party. See id. 
101. The OST does not expressly provide for an enforcement mechanism, but if 
the parties cannot come to an agreement, then they can go to the International Court 
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In addition, the OST does not limit the use of space to certain 
activities, but instead promotes the free use of space, as long as the 
activity conforms with the OST’s interests.102  In other words, while the 
OST’s provisions are not enforceable on all nations,103 the provisions 
provide each nation with a guideline for enacting their own domestic 
space laws in accordance with the treaty. 
The OST’s lack of binding authority prevented an international 
entity from gaining too much power over the regulation of space law.  
The discussion in the 21st General Assembly resolution that led to the 
adoption of the OST, conveys the need to further develop ways of 
building the foundation of international space law.104  The OST’s vague 
language and loose regulatory scheme left international space law 
open—perhaps intentionally—to interpretation and domestic 
construction.105  Over time, this significantly affected the evolution of 
space law. 
Implementing these three factors allowed the United Nations to 
address major Cold War concerns, and it established a collaborative 
approach for utilizing the space exploration to promote the greater 
good.  Additionally, the liberal framing allowed nations to remain 
unbound by an international authority.  Overall, it instilled a universal 
mentality that promoted the exploration of space for a common purpose 
and in a joint effort to avoid catastrophe at a potentially unprecedented 
level in outer space. 
                                                          
of Justice. However, that requires that the court accept the case and that the disputing 
parties accept jurisdiction, which poses great difficulties for reaching a resolution. 
Daniel Wilson, Legal Uncertainty May Keep Space Exploration Grounded, LAW 360 
(Sept. 7, 2016, 3:48 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/835962/legal-
uncertainty-may-keep-space-exploration-grounded. 
102. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I. 
103. As is the case with most treaties, the OST is only enforceable against State 
Parties, which the treaty makes clear by referring to State Parties often. See id. art. I-
XVII. 
104. The General Assembly requested that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses 
of Outer Space work on the elaboration of a liability agreement for damages caused 
by launched objects in outer space, study the implications of space communications, 
and report progress in the following session. See G.A. Res. 2222 (XXI), (Dec. 19, 
1966).   
105. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing the large gaps in the OST 
and how countries are passing laws to address unregulated activities such as 
commercial activity).   
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B.  OST Factors Applied to Other Treaties 
As discussed above, the following factors helped the OST gain 
universal acceptance: (1) its intent to promote the greater good of 
mankind, (2) its focus on a universally accepted concern, and (3) its 
relatively loose restrictions.  The relative impact of these factors can be 
measured by analyzing how they have been applied in subsequent 
treaties that have shaped space law. 
1.  Post-OST Space Treaties That Succeeded 
The OST continues to be the most widely ratified treaty among 
nations, with a total of 109 parties; however, some subsequent treaties 
have also been able to find relative success within the United Nations, 
such as the Registration Convention with sixty-nine parties,106 the 
Liability Convention with ninety-six parties,107 and the Rescue 
Agreement with ninety-eight parties.108  Each of these subsequent 
treaties reiterated the same three factors found in the OST, which played 
a significant role in their success.  Each treaty’s provisions contributed 
to the successful international regulation of space by elaborating on the 
OST’s original provisions. 
2.  Post-OST Space Treaties That Failed 
In 1984, the Moon Agreement marked a significant departure from 
the international space community’s collaborative approach to the 
regulation of space because it did not completely embody the factors 
that had made other treaties successful.  The Moon Agreement does 
satisfy the first factor by promoting the use of space and celestial bodies 
                                                          
106. Status of Treaties: Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into 
Outer Space, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ 
ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIV-
1&chapter=24&Temp=mtdsg3&clang=_en (last visited Oct. 29, 2019). 
107. UNOOSA, STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS RELATING TO 
ACTIVITIES IN OUTER SPACE AS AT 1 JANUARY 2019 5-10 (Apr. 1, 2019), 
http://www.unoosa.org/documents/pdf/spacelaw/treatystatus/AC105_C2_2019_CRP
03E.pdf. 
108. Id.  
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for the greater good of mankind.109  However, the Moon Agreement 
does not successfully incorporate the second and third factors. 
The Moon Agreement did not satisfy the second factor, focus on a 
universally accepted concern, because international interests had 
drastically changed by 1984.  Nuclear disarmament had led to the end 
of the nuclear arms race, thereby diminishing the imminent fear of 
destruction.110  The United States was in a new era of “Reaganomics” 
and free-market activity.111  The Moon Agreement conflicted with 
Western countries’ interests because commercial interests were 
“lukewarm to treaty language that reserve[d] lunar resources for ‘the 
common interest of all mankind.’”112  Furthermore, the Moon 
Agreement was drafted at a time when domestic legislation began to 
regulate space activity, as seen by the passing of the U.S. Commercial 
Space Launch Act of 1984, which allowed private companies to launch 
objects into space.113  Without the presence of a universally appealing 
concern, such as the prevention of nuclear holocaust, the Moon 
Agreement was undermined by polarizing interests, which hindered its 
ability to gain universal acceptance. 
The Moon Agreement did not satisfy the third factor, relatively 
loose restrictions, because the Moon Agreement over-regulated space 
activity by giving binding authority to an international entity. 114  This 
would limit a sovereign nation’s ability to act in its best interest when 
conducting space activity.  Therefore, major spacefaring nations have 
                                                          
109. This first factor was met because the primary purpose of the Moon 
Agreement’s provisions is to mandate that the Moon is strictly used for peaceful 
purposes to benefit mankind. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. I, IV; see also 
Mitchell, supra note 28, at 433. 
110. See generally Norris, supra note 86 (discussing the historical development 
of nuclear arms from their birth to the disarmament that occurred as a result of the end 
of the Cold War). 
111. See generally Kimberly Amadeo, What Is Reaganomics?  Did It Work?, 
THE BALANCE (Feb. 17, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/reaganomics-did-it-
work-would-it-today-3305569 (discussing the economic policy of Reaganomics and 
its main tenets). 
112. See Krause, supra note 6.  
113. Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, 98 Stat. 3055 (1984). 
114. Throughout the treaty, it is stated that State Parties must give notice to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations before embarking on certain activities. See 
Moon Treaty, supra note 25; see also Krause, supra note 6 (discussing how the OST 
did not address the issue of how a dispute would be resolved). 
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declined to establish international space law and have instead focused 
their efforts on domestic space law.115  Essentially, the Moon 
Agreement strayed from the three factors that made the OST and other 
treaties successful, thus failing to encourage international collaboration 
and shifting the responsibilities of space regulation to national entities. 
3.  Antarctic Treaty 
One treaty that has been compared to the OST is the Antarctic 
Treaty, which is often considered a blueprint to the OST.116  The 
Antarctic Treaty is an international treaty that governs how the 
signatory nations are to use the continent of Antarctica. 117  Like the 
OST, the Antarctic Treaty has gained wide acceptance among the 
international community, with fifty-three parties to the treaty.118  The 
treaty has been considered a success, perhaps because it contains the 
same factors present in the OST. 
First, the Antarctic Treaty promotes a peaceful agreement between 
nations to allow unrestricted access to Antarctica for purposes of 
conducting scientific research.119  In retrospect, “the Antarctic Treaty 
is seen as one of the most successful international treaties because the 
international cooperation it fostered has led to significant scientific and 
environmental discoveries, such as the depletion of the atmospheric 
ozone layer.”120  Thus, like the OST, which promotes the use of outer 
space for the good of mankind, the Antarctic Treaty promotes the use 
of Antarctica for discoveries that can benefit all. 
                                                          
115. The most notable space treaties were enacted in the 1960s and 1970s. See 
American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
116. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 436. 
117. See generally Antarctic Treaty, June 23, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 794 [hereinafter 
Antarctic Treaty].  
118. This argument is based on the fact that major spacefaring nations like the 
United States and Russia are State Parties to the treaty. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, THE 
ANTARCTIC TREATY (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.state.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/141-Antarctic-Treaty.pdf.  
119. The main restrictions on access are in regard to purely military activities. 
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 117, art I. 
120. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 437. 
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Second, the Antarctic Treaty was drafted in the late 1950s, a few 
short years before the OST’s provisions were conceived.121  The 
Antarctic Treaty reflected many of the OST’s same concerns, such as 
the Cold War concerns regarding peaceful military purposes, scientific 
research, and cooperation among nations.122 
Lastly, the Antarctic Treaty was successful because like the OST, 
it was not overly restrictive, as it allowed sovereign nations to utilize 
Antarctica for scientific research and progress.  In fact, it was less 
restrictive than the OST because it also allowed for territorial claims, 
unlike the OST, which included a non-appropriation clause.123 
4.  The OST Factors and Article VI 
As discussed, Article VI of the OST has long served as the basis for 
domestic and international commercial regulation of outer space.  
However, Article VI has failed to provide guidance needed to regulate 
the exponential advancement of the commercialization of space.  In 
recent years, the application of Article VI to commercial actors has 
undermined the effectiveness of the three factors. 
First, Article VI does not promote the general welfare of mankind 
because it focuses on governments’ right to control commercial space 
activities,124 which is generally seen as self-serving.  This conflicts with 
the OST’s original purpose of serving the greater good of mankind. The 
shift toward commercial benefits, which by their nature serve the 
interests of a few, may arouse suspicions about the true intentions 
behind Article VI regulations. 
Second, space regulation no longer focuses on Cold War concerns.  
Contemporary concerns center on how to regulate the rapid increase of 
                                                          
121. However, the treaty did not enter into force until June 23, 1961. See 
Antarctic Treaty, U.S DEP’T OF STATE, https://2009-
2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
122. See Mitchell, supra note 28, at 436-37 (discussing that besides promoting 
the peaceful use of Antarctica, there are prohibitions on nuclear testing and waste 
disposal). 
123. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 117, art. IV; see also Outer Space Treaty, 
supra note 2, art. II. 
124. The OST does not mention private actors. Instead, responsibility and 
liability for space activity by “non-governmental entities” fall on the relevant State 
Party. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI.  
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space commercialization.125  Commerce in space is inherently 
competitive and appears to be tailored toward private financial gain.126  
As competition increases, so do differences in how to interpret Article 
VI and its applicability to private actors. 
Lastly, there is vast disagreement on how much regulation to allow 
through Article VI.  In particular, one question remains unanswered: 
Who should have the international authority to enforce provisions or 
settle disputes?  Some advocate for a strict interpretation of Article VI 
that supports creating a binding authority able to directly control 
commercial space actors.127  Others have argued for a looser 
interpretation that supports promoting free market activity.128  As a 
result of these conflicting interpretations, the restrictive nature of 
Article VI remains unclear.  International cooperation in space law was 
achieved under the original intent of the OST.  When it was created, the 
OST’s goal was to address concerns stemming from the Cold War. The 
shift toward regulating private actors by using Article VI as a basis has 
proved to be ineffective and has weakened the factors that have made 
past treaties successful. 
The three OST factors seem to be essential in treaties that have 
succeeded.  The most successful international agreements have been 
based on accomplishing feats for the greater good of mankind.  A strong 
platform that does not contain the same flaws as Article VI is both 
urgent and necessary to address the lack of international regulation in 
the face of a new space era. 
III.  PLANETARY PROTECTION: A NEW PLATFORM 
A different platform, rather than Article VI, can create more 
uniformity in the international realm of space law by reinforcing the 
                                                          
125. Specifically, the concern is about regulating resource extraction and new 
activities in space. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
126. “A decision was made [by Congress] to put priority on nurturing the 
commercial space flight industry and a program was put into place to help commercial 
companies that wanted to get into human space flight by giving them a customer-
ferrying ISS crews.” See Lerner, supra note 45. 
127. The previous U.S. FAA administration followed a strict interpretation in 
seeking to regulate everything in space. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33. 
128. See id. (arguing that not everything needs to be regulated in space just 
because it is a new and unregulated field).  
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OST factors.  Regulation of commercial space activity through Article 
VI has resulted in different interpretations on how Article VI should be 
applied.  It will be more effective to create a different, more universally 
appealing platform than to attempt to reconcile the different 
interpretations of Article VI.  The goal will be to reestablish the OST’s 
factors and promote collaboration among the international community 
in order to extend the OST to regulate commercial space activity.  
Planetary protection is one platform that may accomplish this goal. 
A.  Planetary Protection: Background 
Planetary protection is an emerging issue that needs to be addressed 
in the commercial space industry.  Increased activity in space raises 
concern about the planetary protection of Earth and other celestial 
bodies.  It should be noted that “planetary protection has . . . gained a 
higher profile” because the space industry is expecting exponential 
growth within the next decade.129 
1.  Planetary Protection Issues 
Several planetary protection issues arise from the emergence of the 
commercial space industry.  One issue is planetary contamination, 
which is the contamination of celestial bodies, asteroids, and space by 
humans.130  Another concern is that space actors may bring 
contamination back into Earth, such as microbes, chemicals, and 
radiation–-all of which can be detrimental to Earth’s safety.131  Other 
                                                          
129. As companies become serious about sending humans to Mars and beyond, 
the issue has gained much attention, specifically in terms of safety and survival. Marc 
Kaufman, Planetary Protection Is a “Wicked” Problem, NASA (May 17, 2017), 
https://astrobiology.nasa.gov/news/planetary-protection-is-a-wicked-problem/.  
130. “If someone proposes to mine an asteroid or the Moon, we should regulate 
that activity, for example, to prevent contamination of these celestial bodies (which is 
an obligation under the treaty) and also back-contamination on Earth (if anything is 
brought back to Earth). We need to ensure that the activity is safe and that it complies 
with the treaty.” See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33; see also Kaufman, supra 
note 129. 
131. See generally New Report Addresses Limiting Interplanetary 
Contamination During Human Missions, NASA (Nov. 2, 2016), 
https://www.nasa.gov/feature/new-report-addresses-limiting-interplanetary-
contamination-during-human-missions (stating that “‘[i]t’s critical to establish the 
27
Harper: Planetary Protection:  A New Launch Pad for the Regulation of the
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2020
Harper camera ready (Do Not Delete) 1/18/2020  11:08 AM 
234 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50 
issues include harming the environment of celestial bodies and space 
debris by littering Earth’s orbit.132 
2.  Current Regulations for Planetary Protection 
Current planetary protection regulations are insufficient to prevent 
planetary contamination because they do not have any binding 
international authority.  Under the OST and the Liability Convention, 
indemnification laws hold states accountable for any damages caused 
by their actors. 133  However, this merely establishes liability and it does 
not provide any preventative measures.  Additionally, the OST only 
holds states liable for the damages caused by their own private actors, 
which does not encourage international cooperation in protecting the 
celestial environment. 
In 2002, the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) created 
international guidelines for planetary protection.134  COSPAR is an 
international agency that promotes scientific research of space on an 
international level.135  It serves as an objective and scientific forum for 
the exchange of information regarding space research.136  It has been 
acknowledged as an agency that helps establish cooperation between 
                                                          
quantitative requirements now, that engineers need to follow while designing human-
rated systems for travel beyond Earth orbit’”). 
132. “States Parties to the Treaty shall pursue studies of outer space, including 
the Moon and other celestial bodies, and conduct exploration of them so as to avoid 
their harmful contamination and also adverse changes in the environment of the Earth 
resulting from the introduction of extraterrestrial matter, and where necessary, shall 
adopt appropriate measures for this purpose.” See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, 
art. IX; see also G. KMINEK, C. CONLEY, V. HIPKIN, H. YANO & COSPAR, 
COSPAR’S PLANETARY PROTECTION POLICY 13 (2017), 
https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/sites/default/files/pppolicydecember_2017.pdf [hereinafter 
COSPAR POLICY]. 
133. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. VII; Liability Convention, supra 
note 22, art. V. 
134. “NASA proposed a consolidation of various COSPAR decisions on 
Planetary Protection into a single policy document (first time since 1964), which was 
accomplished in 2002.” CATHARINE A. CONLEY, WHAT IS PLANETARY PROTECTION? 
14 (Mar. 7, 2017), https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/ssbsite/documents/ 
webpage/ssb_178093.pdf.  
135. About, COSPAR, https://cosparhq.cnes.fr/about (last visited Oct. 30, 
2019). 
136. Id.  
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the East and West in space.137  COSPAR created a Planetary Protection 
Policy that lays out non-binding guidelines for planetary protection.138  
The policy itself states that it is intended only to be a guideline for 
nations to follow.139 
NASA, the European Space Agency, and the Japanese Aerospace 
Exploration Agency have established their own system of planetary 
protection policies to meet the international guidelines for planetary 
protection under the OST.140  However, some countries have not 
adopted similar policies to regulate their commercial use.  With 
increased technological and financial feasibility for private actors to get 
into space, there is a concern that some private actors might not follow 
the COSPAR guidelines for planetary protection, unless their respective 
governments directly regulate their activities.  With no binding 
international standard for planetary protection, Earth (and celestial 
bodies in space) may be vulnerable to those nations that do not follow 
binding regulatory guidelines. 
3.  Need for Regulation 
The lack of binding regulation for commercial space actors and 
their activities can detrimentally affect the success of a planetary 
protection platform.141  Experts have highlighted the urgency of 
developing a better and more strategic plan for planetary protection, 
                                                          
137. Id. 
138. “COSPAR maintains and promulgates this planetary protection policy for 
the reference of spacefaring nations, both as an international standard on procedures 
to avoid organic-constituent and biological contamination in space exploration, and 
to provide accepted guidelines in this area to guide compliance with the wording of 
this UN Space Treaty and other relevant international agreements.” See COSPAR 
POLICY, supra note 132, at 13. 
139. In pertinent part, the introduction to the policy states that this is meant “to 
provide advice on these issues [of extraterrestrial contamination].” See id. at 12. 
140. Planetary Protection, NASA, https://sma.nasa.gov/sma-
disciplines/planetary-protection (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
141. See Leonard David, NASA’s Planetary Protection Policies Need to Be 
Updated, Report Finds, SPACE (July 3, 2018), https://www.space.com/41060-nasa-
planetary-protection-policies-questioned.html (arguing that in the absence of a 
regulatory agency in the United States, NASA needs to update its planetary protection 
policies in order to address private actor exploration of space).  
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indicating that “private-sector space exploration activities are another 
reason why planetary protection policies need re-examination.”142 
B.  How Planetary Protection Will Function 
An international agreement should be established to develop a 
Planetary Protection Agency (PPA), deriving its power from Article 
IX143 of the OST, to address the lack of regulation for both planetary 
protection and commercialization.  The PPA would ignore political 
considerations, like COSPAR, and would have the ability to regulate 
dangerous space activities.  Further, the PPA would impose provisions 
to ensure planetary protection from the space activities of commercial 
and state actors and to avoid harmful contamination in space and on 
Earth.  Scientists educated in planetary protection would be in charge 
of running the PPA.  The scope of the PPA’s regulation would 
encompass all space activity by all actors in space without 
distinguishing between state or private actors.  Thus, this regulation will 
protect space from dangerous policies that are influenced by differing 
economic or political ideologies. 
1.  Article IX as a Basis for Regulation 
A close analogy of how PPA regulation would work is how the U.S. 
Congress uses its Commerce Power to regulate private commercial 
action in the United States.  One of the powers given to Congress by 
the U.S. Constitution is the power to “regulate commerce with foreign 
nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes.”144  
This power is frequently cited as the basis for Congress enacting 
legislation.145  One way Congress may regulate private commercial 
                                                          
142. Id. 
143. Article IX provides that states “shall pursue studies of outer space, 
including the Moon and other celestial bodies, . . . to avoid their harmful 
contamination and . . . adverse changes in the environment of the Earth.” See Outer 
Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX. 
144. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
145. The “Commerce Clause has become the constitutional basis for a 
significant portion of the laws passed by Congress over the last 50 years, and it 
currently represents one of the broadest bases for the exercise of congressional 
powers.” KENNETH R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32844, THE POWER TO 
REGULATE COMMERCE: LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL POWER 1 (2014). 
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activity is if that activity has a substantial effect on interstate 
commerce.146  Similarly, the PPA should be able to regulate the activity 
of sovereign nations and private citizens involved in space activity if 
that activity presents a substantial risk of harm to planetary protection. 
So, how would the PPA justify this authority?  It would begin at the 
domestic level.  Initially, the OST only applied to state actors’ activities, 
but Articles VI and VII of the OST were expanded in the 1972 Liability 
Convention to require that each nation take responsibility for any harm 
caused by its private actors while exploring space.147  Regardless of a 
narrow or broad interpretation of Article VI, there is agreement that if 
a space activity is dangerous, then it should be regulated to prevent 
harm.148 
The PPA should impose liability on states for the harmful actions 
of their private citizens that cause any damage to Earth or other celestial 
bodies.  This provision would add to Article IX of the OST, which 
ensures that states “shall pursue studies of outer space, including the 
Moon and other celestial bodies, . . . to avoid their harmful 
contamination and . . . adverse changes in the environment of the 
Earth.”149  Because governments have an interest in not being held 
liable for the harm caused by their private citizens, there should be some 
balance of power to allow sovereign states to regulate private activity 
in space.  By controlling their citizens’ activities in space, governments 
would likely regulate space commercialization in a way that reduces the 
risk of states being held liable. 
Another concern to consider when framing a new regulatory 
scheme would be how and what power is delegated to a binding 
international entity.  Under Article IX, if a nation believes it may be 
conducting dangerous activities in space that might harm the planet, the 
nation must “undertake appropriate international consultations before 
proceeding with any such activity or experiment.”150  This same 
procedure could be helpful in promoting nations to take responsibility 
                                                          
146. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 119 (1941).  
147. Compare Liability Convention, supra note 22, art. II, with Outer Space 
Treaty, supra note 2, art. VI-VII.  
148. See American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (discussing how rockets can be 
dangerous because of their high explosive yield and as such should be regulated). 
149. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX. 
150. Id. 
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in regulating their own commercial actors.  It would allow the PPA to 
serve as the appropriate international consultation before nations could 
proceed with activities in space.151  Thus, the PPA’s essential function 
would be to preside over space activity to ensure state and private actors 
are in conformity with its regulations. 
2.  Scope of Regulation 
Space regulation is a dangerous enterprise.  Space contains 
untapped potential, and any entity with an ability to regulate it can raise 
serious risks.  However, not regulating the potential can be just as 
dangerous.  With the possibility that there may be abuse of regulatory 
power, how can we ensure the effective implementation of regulations? 
As discussed, commerce power is very broad and gives the U.S. 
Congress the ability to regulate a wide range of private conduct.  Thus, 
to be effective, the PPA’s regulatory power should be tailored to 
specific issues that affect planetary protection.  For example, when an 
entity plans to transport a massive amount of an unstable chemical 
element through the ozone layer, such as uranium, the PPA should have 
the authority to regulate such activity only to the extent that would 
prevent planetary protection from being at risk.  This means that the 
PPA’s regulatory power must be narrowly tailored to bring the activity 
in conformity with the PPA’s planetary protection regulations.  Thus, if 
the entity’s activity conforms with safety standard regulations, the 
PPA’s regulatory power stops, giving the actors the permission to 
proceed.  Under the above-mentioned scenario, the PPA would not be 
able to regulate the shipment of uranium for political or economic 
reasons, such as preventing a nuclear arms buildup or stabilizing the 
global market, as long as the shipment conforms with PPA’s safety 
standard regulations. 
Therefore, on one hand, the PPA should address sovereign nations’ 
interest in conducting space activity with relative freedom.  On the other 
hand, the PPA’s main interest in ensuring planetary protection must not 
be jeopardized.  These interests must be balanced by the PPA when 
regulating a certain type of activity.  Essentially, regulations must not 
be so burdensome as to deter innovation and exploration. 
                                                          
151. Essentially, the PPA would approve or disapprove an activity based on 
some kind of study or research. See id. 
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3.  Burden of Proof 
Another issue involves determining who should carry the burden of 
proof.  Does the PPA have to show that there is a need for an immediate 
planetary protection?  Or does the challenger of the regulation have to 
show that there is no compelling need for planetary protection or that 
the regulation is unreasonably burdensome? 
The PPA should be given self-executing power to regulate space 
activities because it is in everyone’s best interest to protect the earth 
from the potentially devastating and irreparable harm.  The 
environmental harm could potentially be irreversible, so immediate 
protection is necessary.  However, there should be procedural 
safeguards in place to prevent the PPA from gaining too much power.  
For instance, once a regulation is challenged, the challenger, in order to 
satisfy its initial burden, should only be required to present a prima facie 
case that the law is unreasonably burdensome or discriminatory.  To 
prevent the PPA from gaining too much power, and to promote the free 
use of space, the challenger’s burden should be low.  Once the 
challenger meets the prima facie burden, the burden should shift back 
to the PPA to prove the law’s validity.  The PPA’s justification for 
regulation must be based on an environmental rationale because unlike 
speculative, ideological, and complex economic and political 
platforms,152 environmental arguments can be proven with concrete and 
scientific evidence.  This will also prevent the PPA from becoming a 
political or economic branch of spacefaring nations. 
C.  Why Planetary Protection Will Provide a More Effective Platform 
for Regulation 
The OST’s factors, which once fostered cooperation in 
international space law, may be strengthened by extending the OST’s 
regulation of space activity through Article IX to encompass both 
private and state actors. 
                                                          
152. See Bruce R. Scott, The Political Economy of Capitalism 4, 16 (Harvard 
Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 07-037, 2006), 
https://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-037.pdf. 
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1.  Intent to Promote the Greater Good for All of Mankind 
Much like the original intent of the OST, Article IX can help extend 
regulation to commercial actors by having the same intention of 
promoting the interests of the greater good.  Thus, the regulating entity, 
the PPA, must ensure that it does not follow any self-serving 
commercial or political interest because planetary protection is better 
achieved if it only considers the interests of the greater good. 
Therefore, the entity’s regulations will be enacted for the greater 
good of mankind because they will protect the planet from an 
immediate threat, and they will continue the beneficial exploration and 
use of space.  Much like the Cold War concerns over nuclear 
destruction, planetary protection is an issue that may threaten our very 
existence. 
2.  Planetary Protection Is a Universally Accepted Concern 
Article IX provides an environmental platform153 to reestablish 
international cooperation through a universally accepted concern.  
Addressing Cold War concerns fostered the OST’s original success, but 
cooperation faded as international interests transitioned from a focus on 
international peace to a desire for commercial success in space.154  An 
environmental platform of planetary protection may be the universally 
appealing concern that the international community needs to reestablish 
cooperation. 
The millennial155 and younger generations are more inclined to 
respond to regulation through an environmental platform such as 
planetary protection rather than through Article VI.  Article VI has not 
been effective in regulating commercial space activity; it has instead 
generated controversy about its proper interpretation.156  Millennials 
                                                          
153. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 2, art. IX. 
154. See generally Krause, supra note 6 (discussing that a large reason for this 
transition was the lack of a binding authority and the OST’s silence on commercial 
actors). 
155. A millennial is “a person born in the 1980s or 1990s.” Millennial, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/millennial (last visited Oct. 30, 2019). 
156. See generally American Bar Ass’n, supra note 33 (addressing that there 
are potential problems with both the under and over regulation of space activity). 
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may be more open to regulating state and private actors if it is narrowly 
tailored to an environmental platform, as seen by their attitude toward 
issues like climate change. 
A . . . study, released in March by Pew, found that 65 percent of all 
U.S. millennials say both that there is solid evidence of global 
warming and attribute this primarily to human activity—the only 
generation for which this viewpoint has a clear majority. And an MIT 
study found that millennials self-identify as climate conscious, with 
most believing they care more about protecting the environment than 
older generations.157 
Millennials concern regarding environmental issues is similar to the 
apocalyptic mentality people had during the Cold War Era over nuclear 
destruction.  The Millennial generation is important because it may very 
well be the first generation to build the new era of the commercial space 
industry.  Reports indicate that there will be a substantial growth in the 
commercial space industry within the next decade.158  Since this new 
era is in the near future, regulation is urgent. 
Environmental concerns were compelling enough to help the 
Antarctic Treaty find success in the twentieth century by addressing 
concerns over “the depletion of the atmospheric ozone layer.”159  
Arguably, these environmental concerns are even more compelling and 
accepted in 2019 among Millennials who will likely take over the new 
era of the commercial space industry. 
3.  New Regulations Would Not Be Overly Restrictive 
Much like the OST, this proposal is also not overly restrictive for 
an agency that regulates all space activity, including state and private 
actors.  OST’s Article IX power is an extremely narrow regulatory 
scheme designed to address a very specific type of issue.  The PPA’s 
environmental platform only has one interest: the preservation of life 
                                                          
157. Madeleine Cuff, Eco-operation: Why Your Climate Strategy Is Central to 
Wooing Millennials, GREENBIZ (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.greenbiz.com/article/eco-operation-why-your-climate-strategy-central-
wooing-millennials. 
158. See BUS. WIRE, supra note 42.  
159. Mitchell, supra note 28, at 437. 
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on Earth and other celestial bodies.  Unlike a purely environmental 
justification, commercialization is inherently prone to political and 
economic bias; thus, any economic and political justification has been 
met with scrutiny.160  This single planetary protection justification 
contains less bias and leaves no room for disagreement—Who doesn’t 
want to save the planet? 
Like the successful Antarctic Treaty, experts and scientists will run 
the PPA.  Science based decisions will allow these experts to prove their 
justifications through scientific evidence rather than through 
ideological debate over interpretation, as is the case with Article VI.  
For this reason, the PPA would have the ultimate burden to prove its 
regulation is in conformity with the OST.  If there is scientific evidence 
to justify a regulation, the PPA should be able to easily present the 
supporting evidence.  Therefore, this planetary protection platform is 
tailored to be less restrictive because the PPA has to meet the ultimate 
burden of showing that its execution of power is justified through 
scientific evidence.  This will prevent the PPA from wielding excessive 
regulatory authority. 
CONCLUSION 
The rapid increase of space commercialization makes the risk of 
harm to planetary protection more realistic; therefore, it must be 
addressed.  I hope that drawing attention to this risk will rally the next 
generation into action, especially given that the Millennial generation 
will be the main player in the new space age and will have expressed 
its appeal for environmental platforms. 
Much like the OST, the success of this new platform will depend 
on addressing the concerns of our era.  The world witnessed how the 
OST aligned with many Cold War concerns.  That alignment helped 
explain the OST’s nearly universal acceptance as the foundation of 
space law.  Now, the environmental justification for creating the 
Planetary Protection Agency may lead to similar success.  Admittedly, 
                                                          
160. Describing investors in the space industry as “very successful business 
people, who are not doing it as a science experiment but because they see a 
commercial return.” See Jane Bird, Commercialisation of Space Is New Final 
Frontier, FIN. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.ft.com/content/fcc72e0c-7564-
11e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0; see also Scott, supra note 152, at 4, 16. 
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it is an optimistic proposal, but one founded on the lessons we have 
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